We show that CEO gender helps explain corporate decision making. In particular, we document that firms run by female CEOs have lower leverage, less volatile earnings, and a higher chance of survival than firms run by male CEOs. The results are robust to various tests for endogeneity, including firm fixed effects and change specifications, propensity score matching, a switching regression analysis with endogenous switching, and a treatment effects model. We further document that this risk-avoidance behavior appears to lead to distortions in the capital allocation process. These results have important macroeconomic implications for long-term economic growth.
I. Introduction
In this paper, we provide evidence that gender diversity plays an important role in corporate choices. We document that female CEOs tend to avoid riskier investment and financing opportunities. We further show that the risk-avoidance behavior of female CEOs appears to lead to distortions in corporate investment policies.
Our results have important implications, as the degree of efficiency of the capital allocation process is a fundamental underpinning of economic growth (Bagehot, 1873 , Beck, Levine and Loayza, 2000 , Greenwood and Jovanovic, 1990 , John, Litov and Yeung, 2008 . Under perfect capital markets, managers should choose investments so as to maximize the market value of the firm.
Equivalently, managers should undertake all (and only) positive expected net present value projects (Fama and Miller, 1972) . In this framework, neither the preferences of managers nor those of the firm's owners play any role in the investment selection choice. Traditional explanations for why decision makers' preferences and characteristics play a role in the investment selection choice include agency (Jensen and Meckling, 1976, Jensen, 1986) , asymmetric information (Myers and Majluf, 1984) , and behavioral considerations (Roll, 1986 , Malmendier and Tate, 2005 , 2008 , and Malmendier, Tate, and Yan, 2011 .
Our story builds upon the experimental economics and psychology literature, as surveyed by Croson and Gneezy (2009) and Bertrand (2011) . This literature documents gender-related differences in risk-aversion. Bruce and Johnson (1994) and Johnson and Powell (1994) study how betting behavior varies with gender. They provide evidence that women display a lower propensity for risktaking than men. Hudgens and Fatkin (1985) document that gender related differences in risk-taking are also present in a military framework. Sundén and Surette (1998) and Bernasek and Shwiff (2001) document that women are significantly more risk-averse in their allocation of wealth to pensions.
Evidence that gender diversity affects corporate decisions or outcomes includes Adams and Ferreira (2009) , Ahern and Dittmar (2012) , and Weber and Zulehner (2010) . For example, Adams and Ferreira (2009) provide evidence that CEO turnover correlates more strongly with poor performance when the board of directors is more gender-diverse. Ahern and Dittmar (2012) document that the introduction of mandatory board member gender quotas led to an increase in acquisitions and performance deterioration in Norwegian publicly traded firms. 1 Weber and Zulehner (2010) document that start-ups with female first hires display a higher likelihood of survival.
There is, however, very little evidence that these differences extend to corporate decisionmakers, i.e. managers, as women rarely serve as top managers of publicly traded corporations.
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While it is well documented for the general population that women are more risk-averse than men,
given the specific and rare combination of skills needed to ascend to a high management position, there should not be a difference between males and females among top executives. Further, there is no direct evidence as to whether gender-driven differences in risk-taking choices lead to misallocation of capital.
This body of evidence on differences in risk aversion leads to two testable hypotheses. First, firms run by female CEOs will make less risky corporate choices and experience less volatile outcomes. This prediction is a direct consequence of women's higher risk aversion. Second, the avoidance of risky projects with positive expected net present values will reduce the efficiency of the capital allocation process.
To test our predictions, we employ "Amadeus Top 250,000," a database covering a large number of European privately-held and publicly-traded companies. Disclosure requirements in Europe require private companies to publish annual information. As a consequence, the database allows us to gather a large sample of firms run by female CEOs. In support of our first prediction, we document that firms run by female CEOs have lower leverage, less volatile earnings and a higher chance of survival than firms run by male CEOs. These results are robust to controlling for standard determinants of risk-taking.
To assess the efficiency of capital allocation, we estimate the sensitivity of corporate investment to the industry's marginal (Tobin's) Q. We borrow the basic idea from Wurgler (2000) , and use the procedure developed by Durnev, Morck and Yeung (2004) to measure marginal Q -the change in firm value associated with an unexpected change in investments. We focus on the sensitivity to marginal Q as theory states that this measures the value created by the investment decision. We document that male CEOs invest more in industries that have higher marginal Q, i.e., in projects that create more value for well diversified shareholders. However, investments of firms run by female CEOs are not significantly related to marginal Q. Thus, female CEOs do not appear to allocate more funds to projects that create more value for well diversified shareholders. From this perspective, female CEOs do not appear to allocate capital efficiently. Similar conclusions are reached if value added growth is instead used as a proxy for the quality of investment opportunities, as in Wurgler (2000) .
A caveat in the interpretation of our results, as in any empirical study, is the issue of endogeneity. In particular, gender could be a selection criterion for the CEO. Thus, owners of firms with less risky investment opportunities may choose female CEOs while owners of firms with riskier investment opportunities may choose male CEOs. Self-selection is a tricky issue, as identifying the role of gender on risk-taking choices requires an exogenous shock to CEO gender that is independent of other determinants of risk-taking. In this regard, finding a natural experiment is highly unlikely.
Additionally, if one could identify a natural experiment, it is unlikely that the results would generalize to the majority of CEOs.
We nevertheless take a number of steps to address the issue of endogeneity. First, we include a number of control variables to reduce the possibility of spurious correlation. In particular, we control for CEO ownership and block ownership to address agency considerations. Further, we control for size and industry to address asymmetric information concerns. Our results are robust to adding these (and other) control variables. Third, we employ a propensity score matching procedure to compare firms run by female CEOs to a group of similar peers run by male CEOs. As the control firms are restricted to a set of peers that are virtually indistinguishable in terms of observable firm characteristics, the firms run by female CEOs should take as much risk as firms run by male CEOs if CEO gender was indeed irrelevant for risk-taking preferences. However, even after matching using a propensity score approach, we continue to find statistically significant differences in corporate risk-taking depending on CEO gender.
Fourth, we employ a switching regression analysis with endogenous switching. This allows us to control for endogenous self-selection regarding appointing a male or a female CEO and the possibility that self-selection alone might explain the risk-taking choices. One advantage of this methodology is that it allows us to perform a counterfactual analysis. In other words, ceteris paribus, it allows us to infer what the leverage (or volatility of earnings or survival rate) of a company run by a male CEO would have been had it been run by a female CEO. Once again, after controlling for the potential endogenous matching between firms and CEOs, we still find that female CEOs tend to take on less risk than their male counterparts.
Fifth, we employ a treatment effects model. This allows us to explicitly test whether CEO gender still plays a role in financial and investment policies after any kind of self-selection due to unobservables has been explicitly controlled for. Even after controlling for unobservable private information that leads certain firms to select a female CEO, the results of the treatment effects model confirm the strong effect of CEO gender on corporate risk-taking choices.
Last but not least, we note that while some kind of endogenous matching between firms and CEOs takes place (at least to some extent) in our sample, in the presence of optimal matching (from the standpoint of well diversified shareholders) we should find a positive association between investments and marginal Q. This should occur for firms run by either male or female CEOs. The gender associated difference in the efficiency of capital allocation that we document is, in this sense, inconsistent with optimal matching.
Why does such suboptimal capital allocation behavior persist in equilibrium? As we document, most of the firms in our sample are private firms with concentrated ownership. This precludes traditional corporate control mechanisms such as incentives (stock options etc.) or disciplinary takeovers, as there is no organized, liquid capital market in which the shares of these firms can be freely bought or sold. Further, since the wealth and human capital of this risk-averse CEO are largely concentrated in the firm she manages 3 , she will seek to avoid increasing firm-specific risk which would decrease her expected utility. This behavior distorts the capital allocation process. With this in mind, matching may be endogenous in the sense that relatively undiversified owners who have a preference for less risky investments opportunities may choose female CEOs (or serve as the CEO themselves) while owners who have a preference for riskier investment opportunities may choose male CEOs. At the same time, this matching is not optimal in a "traditional" sense as corporate choices depend on the preferences of undiversified utilitymaximizing decision-makers as opposed to responding to a market value maximization rule.
This paper complements the literature of how managerial traits affect corporate decision making. Those studies include Bertrand and Schoar (2003) , Cain and McKeon (2012) , Cronqvist, Makhija and Yonker (2012 ), and Malmendier and Tate (2005 , 2008 and Malmendier, Tate, and Yan (2011) . We add to this literature by showing that CEO gender is yet another important trait leading to differences in corporate choices. The paper also contributes to the literature on the efficiency of capital allocation (Durnev, Morck and Yeung, 2004 , McLean, Zhang, and Zhao, 2012 , Morck, Yavuz and Yeung, 2011 , Wurgler, 2000 . Our paper is the first to provide evidence that differences in managerial traits, in particular gender, have implications for the quality of the capital allocation process.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II describes the data. Sections III and IV present the regression results and discuss the source of the inefficiencies observed. Section V discusses alternative interpretations of the results. Section VI concludes.
his/her ownership position. Assuming that these positions represent the CEO's entire portfolio, we calculate the fraction of the CEO's portfolio invested in each firm. Based on the investments that we observe in Amadeus, on average, 91.5% of the selected CEOs' observed wealth is invested in the company they manage. Given this evidence, CEOs appear to be largely undiversified.
II. Data
Most of the data used in the paper are taken from For France, Germany, Italy, Spain, and the United Kingdom, the database includes all companies that meet at least one of the following criteria: (1) revenues of at least €15m, (2) total assets of at least €30m, (3) at least 200 employees. For the other countries, the database includes all companies that meet at least one of the following criteria: (1) revenues of at least €10m, (2) total assets of at least €20m, (3) at least 150 employees. 5 Amadeus removes firms from the database five years after they stop reporting financial data. These drawbacks are also discussed in Klapper, Leaven and Rajan (2006) and Popov and Roosenboom (2009 
II.B. Risk-Taking
We consider three measures of risk-taking. The first measure, Leverage, is a measure of the riskiness of corporate financing choices. The intuition is simple: given a (negative) shock to a firm's underlying business conditions, the higher the leverage, the greater the (negative) impact of the shock on the firm's net profitability (including a higher probability of default). Leverage is defined as the ratio of financial debt divided by the sum of financial debt plus equity. Financial debt is the sum of long term debt (excluding "other non-current liabilities") and short term loans. Across the firms in our sample, the average Leverage ratio is 37.4%. This ratio is 32.4% for firms with a female CEO and 37.9% for firms with a male CEO (the p-value of the difference between the two is less than 0.001).
The other two risk-taking variables are measures of the riskiness of outcomes. σ(ROA) is the volatility of the firm's operating return on assets, defined as the ratio of earnings before interest and taxes to total assets. Volatility of returns is a standard proxy for risk in the financial economics literature. This variable captures the riskiness of investment decisions. Further, earlier work by John, Litov, and Yeung (2008) establishes that the volatility of firm-level operating profits has a positive impact on long term economic growth. We focus on the volatility of accounting returns (as opposed to stock market returns) as the vast majority of firms in our sample are privately held. We calculate the standard deviation of the returns over 5-year overlapping windows (1999-2003, 2000-2004, 2001-2005, 2002-2006, 2003-2007, 2004-2008 and 2005-2009) . Across all firms in the sample, the average volatility of ROA is 4.8%. As with Leverage, there is a significant difference in this variable (p-value < 0.001) between firms run by female CEOs (2.7%) and firms run by male CEOs (5.0%).
Third, we exploit the notion that riskier firms are less likely to survive, and focus on the likelihood of surviving over a 5-year period. For a firm to enter this analysis, we only require that CEO gender, ownership, and accounting data be available for at least one year during 1999-2005.
Since firms that enter our sample in 2005 or earlier could have up to five years or more of data, we focus on these observations to assess the likelihood of survival. This specification has two main advantages. First, there is no survivorship bias, as both surviving and non-surviving companies are included in the analysis. Second, this measure of risk-taking is unaffected by accounting manipulation. We find that 51.7% of the firms in the sample survive at least 5 years. The likelihood of survival is 61.4% for firms with a female CEO and 50.5% for firms with a male CEO. The difference between female and male CEOs is statistically significant with a p-value of less than 0.001.
II.C. Control Variables
We include a number of control variables in each of the risk-taking regressions. The data used to construct these control variables are taken from Amadeus. CEO Ownership is calculated as the cash flow rights of the CEO on the firm's earnings. Since a high level of ownership aligns the CEO's incentives with those of minority shareholders, we use CEO ownership to control for agency conflicts. Cash flow rights is the ownership rights of the largest ultimate shareholder. 10 The higher the ownership of a large shareholder, the greater the incentive to monitor the CEO. This would in turn mitigate agency conflicts. Ln (Size) is the natural log of total assets (in thousands US$), expressed in 2000 prices. Total assets is the sum of fixed assets (tangible and intangible fixed assets and other fixed assets) and current assets (inventory, receivables, and other current assets). ROA is defined as the ratio of earnings before interests and taxes to total assets. We include firm profitability to control for differences in management quality. Sales Growth is calculated as the annual rate of growth of sales. We use sales growth as our control variable (rather than the market-to-book ratio) as most of the firms in the sample are private. Ln (1+Age) is the natural logarithm of (1 + the number of years since incorporation). This variable controls for differences in the life cycle of a firm.
Tangibility is calculated as the ratio of fixed to total assets. Private firm is an indicator denoting firms that are not publicly traded. We use this variable as a proxy for capital constraints. Summary information for all control variables is reported in Table 1 . The sample includes 132,590 firms and 338,397 firm-year observations.
III. CEO Gender and Risk-Taking: Regression Results
To assess the relation between gender and corporate risk-taking, we start by regressing our measures of risk-taking on CEO gender and other determinants of risk-taking that, if excluded, could induce spurious correlations. In particular, we control for ownership concentration, profitability, sales growth, firm size, firm age, asset tangibility, and a private firm indicator along with country, industry, and year fixed effects. The results are reported in Table 2 .
Leverage is the dependent variable in Regression (1). Regression (1) (3)), all independent variables are measured at the first year-end of the sample period over which the volatility of earnings (or the likelihood of survival) is measured.
The results show that the volatility of a firm's ROA is significantly lower when the firm is run by a female CEO (p-values ≤ 0.001). As with Leverage, the difference in the volatility of firmlevel profitability between firms run by female and male CEOs is sizeable (1.998/100=0.020) relative to the sample mean (0.048).
Regression (3) Table 2 indicate significantly higher survival rates for companies run by female CEOs. To the extent that firms that take more risk are less likely to survive through time, this result is consistent with the notion that companies managed by women tend to engage in less risky projects.
Thus, both corporate choices (such as leverage) and corporate outcomes (volatility of profitability and the likelihood of survival) are significantly different depending on the gender of the CEO.
III.A. Endogeneity Concerns
As with any empirical study, a caveat in the interpretation of our results is the issue of endogeneity. In the following sub-sections, we take a number of steps to address this concern.
III.A.1 Firm Fixed Effects
Our first endogeneity concern arises from the possibility that our results could be influenced by omitted variables. In particular, the documented correlation between CEO gender and corporate risk-taking may simply reflect unobservable characteristics that affect both CEO gender choice and corporate risk-taking choices. The specific concern is that the omission of these factors might lead us to incorrectly attribute the differences in risk-taking to differences in CEO gender.
In this section, we exploit the panel dimension of our dataset to control for time-invariant firm specific characteristics which may be correlated with omitted explanatory variables. More specifically, we add firm fixed effects to the (panel) regression specifications. The inclusion of firm fixed effects removes any purely cross-sectional correlation between gender and risk-taking, greatly reducing the risk of spurious correlation.
In Panel A of Table 3 we replicate our earlier analysis (with firm fixed effects now included)
for leverage and the volatility of firm-level profitability. These results strongly corroborate the previous evidence. The magnitude of the effect of gender on risk-taking is again both economically and statistically significant, with p-values of less than 0.001.
In Panel B of Table 3 we use change regression specifications to identify the effect of gender on risk-taking. Since the level of risk-taking observed at a given point in time reflects cumulative past decisions, tests based on risk-taking levels may have low power to explain marginal decisions. In contrast, the change specifications focus on year-to-year changes in gender and risk-taking, making them more powerful for explaining incremental decisions. Importantly, these change specifications support our conclusion that CEO gender affects risk-taking choices.
III.A.2 Propensity Score Matching
A second concern stems from the idea that gender could be a selection criterion for the CEO.
For example, owners of firms with less risky investment opportunities may choose female CEOs while owners of firms with riskier investment opportunities may choose male CEOs. It is evident from Table 1 that firms run by male and firms run by female CEOs differ across several characteristics. Simply controlling for these attributes (as in the previous analyses) might be insufficient.
To address this concern, in this section we employ a propensity score matching procedure (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983) to identify a control sample of firms that are run by male CEOs and that exhibit no observable differences in characteristics relative to the firms run by female CEOs.
Thus, each pair of matched firms are virtually indistinguishable from one another except for one key characteristic: the gender of the CEO. We then compare the Leverage, (ROA) and the likelihood of survival between the two groups. As the control firms are restricted to a set of peers that is almost identical in terms of observable characteristics, firms run by female CEOs are expected to make the same risk-taking choices as firms run by male CEOs.
To implement this methodology, we first calculate the probability (e.g., the propensity score) that a firm with given characteristics is run by a female CEO. This probability is calculated using firm characteristics that we included in the previous regression analyses. More specifically, the propensity score is estimated as a function of ROA, sales growth, the natural log of total assets, the natural log of firm age, asset tangibility, a private firm dummy, the ownership of the CEO, the ownership of the largest ultimate shareholder, country, industry and year dummies. We also control for leverage in the volatility of ROA and survival analyses. To ensure that the firms in the control sample are sufficiently similar to the firms run by a female CEO, we require that the maximum difference between the propensity score of the firm run by a female CEO and that of its matching peer does not exceed 0.1% in absolute value.
The results in Table 4 male CEOs. All differences in risk-taking between the two groups are statistically significant with pvalues less than 0.001. Further, after matching the two groups based on firm characteristics, the observed differences in risk-taking are even greater than in the regressions analyses. More importantly, these results indicate that the previously documented gender-related differences in risktaking are not due to observed differences in firm characteristics.
III.A.3 Switching Regression Analysis
A third concern is that firms may non-randomly self-select into appointing a male or a female CEO and that this self-selection alone might explain the risk-taking choices. We address this concern by employing a switching regression analysis with endogenous switching. This analysis is based on Heckman's (1979) two-step procedure.
The model consists of three equations. First, we have a binary outcome equation which, in our case, models the choice of the CEO gender. We then have two regressions for the variable of interest conditional on the choice of gender. In our case, we perform this test for all three measures of risk-taking: leverage, volatility of firm-level profitability and probability of survival.
Following Maddala (1991) the binary choice model is expressed as:
where is a vector of exogenous variables that influence the choice of firm i to appoint either a female or a male CEO: 1 if * 0 0 if * 0. Accordingly, the two regressions for the variable of interest are expressed as:
Consequently, 1 and 0. The presence of the selection bias lies in the non-zero correlation between the error term in Equation (1) and the error terms in
Equations (2) and (3). Therefore, estimating (2) and (3) via OLS may lead to inconsistent estimates of the regression parameters. Consistent OLS estimators can be instead obtained with a two-stage method following Lee (1978) , Heckman (1979) and Maddala (1983).
We first estimate Equation (1) using a probit model. This is instrumental in obtaining consistent estimates of . These coefficient estimates are used to compute the inverse Mills ratio for
Equations (2) To avoid multicollinearity issues in the estimation of the model, we include two exogenous variables in the first stage. 11 Our first exogenous variable is the local supply of educated women in a given geographic subdivision. As the supply of educated (i.e., qualified) women increases, the likelihood that a firm will appoint a woman as CEO is likely to increase. 12 Our second exogenous variable is the region-specific attitude towards women participating to the labor force. 13 (These variables are described in detail in Appendix B).
Results reported in Table 5 compare observed values for our three proxies of risk-taking with the counterfactuals for both groups: firms run by male CEOs and firms run by female CEOs. For firms run by female CEOs, leverage would have been 38.4% had the firms been run by a male CEO, compared to the actual average leverage of 31.5%. The mean difference in leverage is 6.9 percentage points, which is significant with a p-value of less than 0.001. Similarly, for firms run by male CEOs, leverage would have been 27.2% had the firms been run by a female CEO, compared to the actual average leverage of 37.9%. The difference between the two (10.7 percentage points) is again highly statistically and economically significant.
Similar conclusions are obtained for the other proxies of corporate risk-taking. These tests confirm the previous evidence that, even after controlling for self-selection, women CEOs tend to take on less risk compared to their male counterparts.
11 Technically speaking, the inclusion of exogenous variables is not strictly necessary as identification is achieved by non-linearity in this model. 12 There are strong reasons to expect the local supply of educated women to impact the likelihood that a woman will be appointed as the firm's CEO. First, higher education appears to be an almost necessary condition to be appointed as CEO. For example, Pérez-González (2006) documents that over 90% of the CEOs of U.S. publicly traded firms hold a bachelor's degree or higher. Second, we focus on the local supply of qualified women, as Yonker (2011) documents that U.S. publicly traded firms are five times more likely to hire CEOs from their own state. 13 We argue that the more favorable the attitude towards female labor force participation, the higher the probability that a woman may be hired as the CEO. Countries with a less favorable attitude towards women participating to the labor force do indeed exhibit lower female labor force participation in general (Fernández, 2011) .
III. A.4 Treatment Effects Model
As a last attempt to try to address potential endogeneity concerns, we employ a variation of the Heckman two step approach: the treatment effects model. The first stage of this model is identical to the one outlined above, Equation (1). However, from Equation (1) we calculate only one inverse Mills ratio: the combination of the for firms run by male CEOs and for firms run by female
CEOs. In the second step we include this inverse Mills ratio alongside the dummy variable characterizing CEO gender (and other controls). In this manner, we can explicitly test whether CEO gender still plays a role in financial and investment policies after controlling for self-selection due to unobservable private information.
In Table 6 we report the estimates of the probit coefficients and the treatment effects model coefficients. Once again, we include the local supply of educated women in a given geographic subdivision and the attitude towards women participating to the labor force in the probit model to minimize multicollinearity problems. More importantly, after we add the inverse Mills ratio to correct for self-selection, the coefficient of the CEO gender indicator maintains the same sign as in the earlier specifications. Thus, after accounting for unobserved private information that makes certain firms select a female CEO, there is still a large effect of CEO gender on risk-taking choices.
In particular, female CEOs lead to less corporate risk-taking.
IV. CEO Gender and the Efficiency of Capital Allocation
So far we have documented that female CEOs make less risky corporate choices than male
CEOs. The observed differences in corporate risk-taking do not appear to be the outcome of endogenous matching between firms and CEOs. If this outcome is driven by female CEOs imposing their preferences on corporate choices, the efficiency of the capital allocation process will be undermined. In this section, we investigate whether this is the case.
To measure the efficiency of capital allocation, we look at the degree to which investment is related to the marginal Q, as advocated by theory. Under perfect capital markets, optimal decision making requires that managers undertake all projects with positive expected net present value, and reject all projects with negative expected net present value. If projects were to be ranked based on their expected net present value per dollar of capital invested, managers should invest up to the point where, for the next project in line, the net present value is zero. By doing so, managers would maximize firm value. Equivalently, managers should invest up to the point where the firm's marginal Q is 1. A firm's marginal Q ( ) measures the change in the market value of firm, ∆V, associated with an (unexpected) change in capital investment, ∆I. In other words, To estimate , we largely follow Durnev, Morck and Yeung (2004) . A few changes to their methodology are necessary because of differences in corporate disclosure in Europe. For clarity, in Appendix A we describe each step employed in the estimation procedure, largely borrowing from Durnev, Morck and Yeung's (2004) paper. As shown earlier in Table 1 , the average q , is 1.117, and the median is 0.929. We find a great deal of variation in the estimates of the marginal Q across industries. Interestingly, the marginal Q does not cluster around 1, as we would expect if, across all industries, firms were investing up to the "optimal point." Rather, there is evidence of both underinvestment and overinvestment in different industries.
To assess the efficiency of capital allocation, for all companies in Amadeus we estimate a simple version of the q-model of investment as in Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen (1988) , is the annual change in net Total Fixed Assets, with depreciation added back;
Total Fixed Assets is the sum of tangible fixed assets, intangible fixed assets, and other fixed assets (all net of accumulated depreciation); q , is the proxy for the marginal Q and it reflects the quality of the firm's investment opportunities; , is net income plus depreciation. represents the sensitivity of investments to growth opportunities. Ceteris paribus, the better (worse) the growth opportunities, the more a value maximizing-value manager should invest (divest). is our coefficient of interest which measures the difference in the investment sensitivity to growth opportunities between firms run by female and male CEOs. If CEO gender is irrelevant to investment efficiency, then = 0. only) positive expected net present value projects. Equivalently, managers should undertake all investments with >1, and avoid (or divest) those with < 1. As a consequence, given the presence of differences in the quality of investment opportunities across industries, optimal capital budgeting implies a positive relation between investments and each industry's marginal Q.
Consistent with optimal capital budgeting, the results in Table 7 show that there is a positive and significant association between investments and Tobin's Q for firms run by male CEOs. For example, Regression (1) shows that, for male CEOs, the coefficient of the sensitivity of investment to marginal Q is 0.013, with a p-value of less than 0.001. In other words, these results are consistent with male CEOs investing more when their firm is operating in an industry with good prospects, and divesting capital (or invest less) when the prospects of their firm are poor.
By contrast, the coefficient on the interaction between CEO gender and marginal Q is negative and significant (coeff. = -0.020, p-value < 0.001), implying that, corporate investments are less responsive to marginal Q in firms run by female CEOs. Surprisingly, the magnitude of the coefficient on the interaction term when combined with the coefficient on the marginal Q term implies that firms run by female CEOs fail to invest more when their industry has good prospects, and fail to divest capital when prospects are poor. From Regression (1) we can determine that the sensitivity of investment to marginal Q for firms run by female CEOs is -0.007 (=0.013-0.020), with a p-value of 0.330. This result suggests that women do not appear to allocate capital efficiently.
In unreported tests we find that the results are robust to including other controls such as ownership concentration, profitability, sales growth, firm size, firm age, asset tangibility, and a private firm indicator along with country, industry, and year fixed effects. Ever more importantly, as
Regression (2) indicates, the results are also robust to using a treatment effects specification to control for the endogeneity of the CEO selection choice.
To assess whether risk-avoidance drives inefficient capital allocation in firms run by female CEOs, in Regression (3) we augment our specification with both an index that measures the degree of risk-avoidance and the interaction of this index with marginal Q. If risk-avoidance explains our earlier results, the interaction term between female CEOs and marginal Q should lose its significance due to the explanatory power of the new interaction term. We construct an index based on the three variables used to measure the degree of risk-avoidance. In particular, the index is constructed by adding 1 when (1) a firm's leverage is in the bottom 20% of the distribution; (2) the volatility of firm-level profitability is in the bottom 20% of the distribution; and (3) if the firm survives at least 5 years. The index ranges from 0 to 3, with higher scores denoting greater risk-avoidance.
As shown in Regression (3), the risk-avoidance index is negatively correlated with the level of investment, indicating that more risk-averse CEOs invest less. In addition, the index's interaction with marginal Q indicates that investment is less sensitive to marginal Q when risk-avoidance is high. Most importantly, the results are consistent with our premise that the inefficient capital allocation exhibited by female CEOs is due to risk-avoidance.
IV. A. Value Added Growth
Marginal Q is a theoretically grounded measure of the quality of investment opportunities.
However, the empirical procedure used to compute marginal Q may introduce a lot of estimation error. This error may undermine the credibility and interpretation of the results. Additionally, using Q becomes problematic if we allow for the possibility that mispricing occurs in capital markets. A third problem with the methodology used above arises because we use the estimated marginal Q for publicly traded firms to proxy for the quality of investment opportunities faced by (predominantly) private firms.
In this section, we attempt to circumvent these issues by employing the procedure of Wurgler (2000) to assess the efficiency of the capital allocation process. He suggests that higher firm-level investment in industries with faster value added growth is associated with greater efficiency in the capital allocation process. We thus estimate the sensitivity of investment to the growth in value added (instead of marginal Q). Value added growth is computed as the natural log of the change in value added between year t and year t-1. Value added, in constant US dollars (year 2000 prices), is defined as earnings before interest and taxes plus the cost of employees. The richness of our data allows us to measure value added growth at the firm level. In the estimation, we add firm and year fixed effects to mitigate endogeneity concerns from omitted variables. Results from these robustness tests (see Panel B of Table 7 ) confirm the Panel A results that show that the sensitivity of investment to value added growth is lower for firms run by female CEOs. As with Panel A, Regression (2) indicates that the results are robust to using a treatment effects specification to control for the endogeneity of the CEO selection choice.
V. Alternative Interpretations

V.A. Agency
In an agency context, CEOs act as to maximize their own utility, rather than the utility of (presumably well diversified) shareholders. As a consequence, they make choices that do not (necessarily) maximize firm value (Berle and Means, 1932, Jensen and Meckling, 1976) . This behavior would lead to inefficiencies in the capital budgeting process and would result in a lesser (or even negative) sensitivity of investments to growth opportunities (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer, 2008, McLean, Zhang, and Zhao, 2012) .
While agency considerations likely affect corporate decisions and outcomes, three pieces of evidence are inconsistent with an agency interpretation of our results. First, for agency to explain our results, it must be the case that women are more likely to act at the expense of shareholders than men.
In other words, it has to be the case that female CEOs are less likely to fulfill their fiduciary duties than male CEOs (or, at the extreme, commit corporate crime). However, a number of legal studies document that, if anything, women are less likely to commit crimes (of any kind) than men (Hill and Harris, 1981 , Shover, Norland, James and Thornton, 1979 , Steffensmeier and Allan, 1996 , Gërxhani, 2007 . As such, it appears unlikely that female CEOs be more prone to undertake actions that are detrimental to shareholders.
Second, in an agency framework, the interests of the CEOs become more aligned with those of shareholders as the CEO increases her ownership in the firm she manages (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) . As a consequence, we should observe better investment behavior as CEO ownership increases. However, as shown in Tables 2-6 , we find gender to be associated to risk-taking even after controlling for CEO ownership.
Third, even when separation between ownership and control is present, agency conflicts should be mitigated by the presence of a large shareholder Vishny, 1986, 1997) .
Interestingly, large shareholders are the norm in our sample of predominantly private firms. Thus, CEOs should be less able to imprint their own preferences on corporate choices, and misallocation should be less pronounced, when ownership is highly concentrated. However, in contrast with an agency story, our results hold after controlling for ownership concentration. Based on this evidence, we conclude that agency considerations are unlikely to explain our results.
V. B. Asymmetric Information
If information asymmetries are correlated with gender, the cost of accessing external financing could be different for firms run by male vs. female CEOs. Accounting research documents that the quality of earnings reported by firms with female directors, analysts, or auditors, is significantly better than that of similar companies with male directors, analysts, or auditors (Srinidhi, Gul and Tsui, 2011, Thiruvadi and Huang, 2011) . Thus, the potential for informational asymmetries and for undervaluation should be greater among firms run by male CEOs. As a consequence, there will be more states of nature in which a male CEO chooses not to raise external financing even in the presence of a positive net present value investment opportunity.
This implies a greater distortion in the efficiency of capital allocation when the CEO is a male. This is because male CEOs (who act in the interest of shareholders) will choose not to raise funds to avoid diluting the undervalued equity of the firm they run. As a consequence, they will bypass some investment opportunities that have a positive net present value (Myers and Majluf, 1984) , thus reducing the efficiency of capital allocation. In contrast to this argument, we find less efficient capital allocation among firms run by female CEOs. As such, informational asymmetries cannot explain our results.
V.C. Behavioral Considerations
A third alternative explanation is that women are less overconfident than men. This presumption is well documented in the social psychology literature and in experimental economics studies, as surveyed by Croson and Gneezy (2009). For example, Lundeberg, Fox and Punćochaŕ (1994) show that young boys are more overconfident (when wrong) than young girls. In a study of selection into a competitive environment, Niederle and Vesterlund (2007) document that women tend to shy away from competition, while men embrace competition. They interpret their results, at least in part, as driven by differences in overconfidence. Barber and Odean (2001) document that men trade much more than women and perform worse.
Malmendier and Tate (2005, 2008) and Malmendier, Tate, and Yan (2011) predict that overconfident managers will overestimate the returns to their investments and, as a consequence, will tend to overinvest (when they have sufficient internal resources). In our framework, a natural implication of Malmendier and Tate's work is that men are more likely to understate the riskiness of their investment opportunities and therefore more likely to take excessive risk. Our risk-taking results are certainly in line with such an interpretation. However, overconfidence should lead to misallocation of funds, as overconfident managers misinterpret information and, as a consequence, make poor choices. In contrast to this prediction, we do not find greater misallocation among firms run by male CEOs (rather, we document the opposite). Thus, while we do not dispute the notion that men are more overconfident than women, our results are not consistent with overconfidence being the explanation for the lesser risk-taking of female CEOs and, at the same time, for the better allocation efficiency documented for male CEOs.
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It is likely that men and women differ in levels of both overconfidence and risk-aversion. The results reported in this paper indicate that "excessive" risk-aversion (by female CEOs) is worse than overconfidence (by male CEOs) in terms of implications for the efficiency of capital allocation.
VI. Conclusions
We provide evidence that CEO gender significantly affects corporate risk-taking choices.
More precisely, firms run by female CEOs tend to make less risky financing and investment choices than firms run by male CEOs. The effect of CEO gender on corporate risk-taking is both statistically and economically significant. Further, it is present across a variety of corporate choices and outcomes, and it is robust to controlling for traditional determinants of risk-taking as well as for country, industry, and time trends. The results are robust to various tests for endogeneity, including 15 Moderate degrees of overconfidence by male CEOs could actually reduce investment distortions that arise due to CEO risk aversion (Goel and Thakor, 2008) . While a "moderate overconfidence" story is possibly consistent with the better allocation efficiency of firms run by male (relative to female) CEOs, it does not explain why firms run by female CEOs fail to allocate capital according to a value maximization rule.
firm fixed effects and change specifications, the use of a propensity score matching procedure, a switching regression analysis with endogenous switching, and a treatment effects model.
We further show that the risk-avoidance of female CEOs has important implications for the efficiency of the capital allocation process. We observe a positive association between the quality of investment opportunities (e.g., the net present value) and the level of investments for firms run by male CEOs, but we fail to find such a relation for firms run by female CEOs. Thus, women do not appear to allocate capital efficiently.
Our explanation for these results builds upon previously documented gender-related differences in risk-aversion. In particular, as women are more risk-averse than men, they tend to avoid choices that are (from their perspective) "too risky." In particular, women do not appear to undertake all positive net present value projects. Our results, taken as a whole, cannot be explained with agency, informational asymmetries, or overconfidence considerations.
In equilibrium, why would decision-makers' preferences play a role in the capital budgeting (and capital structure) decisions? In a traditional perfect capital markets framework, managers would undertake all projects with positive net present value, so the preferences of managers would not play any role in corporate investment decisions. However, a large fraction of the firms in our sample are private firms that are managed by relatively undiversified CEOs with varying degrees of riskaversion. Since the wealth and human capital of these risk-averse owner-managers are largely concentrated in the firms that they own, they will seek to avoid increasing firm-specific risk as this would decrease their expected utility. In other words, because CEOs are undiversified, corporate choices will reflect their personal preferences. These implications are more pronounced for female
CEOs since women tend to be more risk-averse than men. We define A , as , , . , is the estimated market value of firm j's property, plant and equipment (PPE). We use a perpetual inventory formula to estimate the market value of PPE, using data for the previous 10 years. 18 In particular, the estimated market value of PPE at the end of year t is computed as:
16 All variables in the regression are winsorized at the top and bottom 1% to reduce the impact of outliers. 17 http://www.econstats.com/wdi/wdiv_758.htm. 18 The first year of data we use in this calculation is 1983. If a company's history is shorter than 10 years, we use the first available data point for that firm.
We set , , . Net PPE is gross property, plant and equipment, less accumulated reserves for depreciation, depletion and amortization (Worldscope item WC02501). We assume a constant annual depreciation rate, , of 10%. The change in gross PPE (Worldscope item WC02301) measures the annual spending in PPE. Therefore, the estimated market value of PPE at the end of year t is equal to the estimated market value of PPE at the end of year t-1 minus 10% depreciation plus (deflated) capital spending during year t.
, is the book value of firm j's short term assets (Worldscope item WC02201), expressed in 2000 prices. We do not attempt to estimate the market value of short term assets, as Worldscope does not provide information on the method used to evaluate inventories (e.g., LIFO vs. FIFO).
Finally, we define d , V , as dividends plus interest expense (Worldscope items WC04551 and WC01251).
Appendix B. Exogenous variables
As a first exogenous variable, we focus on the local supply of educated women in a given geographic subdivision. We gather geographic data on education from Eurostat. For a given geographic subdivision, Eurostat provides the number of students by gender and level of education.
For our purposes, we focus on the first and second stages of tertiary education, which includes any degree equal to or higher than a bachelor's degree. We gather education data for the smallest geographical subdivision covered in Eurostat in each country. 19 We use the postal code or the name of the city in which a firm is headquartered to match the Eurostat education data with the Amadeus CEO gender and accounting data. When the available information is insufficient to match the two data sources, we exclude the firm from the analysis. Using these data, we define the Supply of Educated Women (in each geographic subdivision and in each year) as the ratio of female students to the total number of students in the first and second stages of tertiary education.
As a second exogenous variable, we focus on the region-specific attitude towards women participating to the labor force. We collect information on the attitude towards female labor force participation from the integrated World Bank World Value Survey/European Value Survey (WVS/EVS). These are two large-scale, cross-national, and longitudinal surveys conducted by a large network of social scientists around the world.
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We focus on three questions that are related to the attitude towards the participation of women in the workforce. Respondents were asked whether they (strongly) agree, (strongly) disagree or neither agree nor disagree with the following statements: (1) "When jobs are scarce, men should 19 Examples of the smallest geographic subdivisions are "North West", "East Midlands", "London" and "Wales" in the U.K. The median population across our geographic subdivisions is 1,743,791 inhabitants. In Ireland, Luxembourg, and Switzerland, data are available only at country-level. These countries are not included in the IV regressions. In untabulated tests, we find that the results are qualitatively similar if those countries are included in the analysis. 20 http://www.wvsevsdb.com/wvs/WVSIntegratedEVSWVS.jsp?Idioma=I have more right to a job than women" 2) "Being a housewife is just as fulfilling as working for pay"
3) "Both the husband and wife should contribute to household income". We assign the value of 1 to reflect a more favorable attitude towards women if the answer is "Disagree" or "Strongly Disagree"
in questions 1 and 2 and if the answer is "Agree" or "Strongly Agree" in question 3. We compute the proportion of respondents giving an answer coded as 1 for each question in each given region.
Finally, for each region, we compute the average of the three scores to derive a measure of the attitude towards women, where higher values of the measure indicate more favorable attitudes towards women. As with Eurostat, we use the postal code or the name of the city in which a firm is headquartered to match the WVS/EVS survey data with Amadeus. In regression (1) the dependent variable is Leverage, defined as the ratio of financial debt divided by the sum of financial debt plus equity; in regression (2) the dependent variable is the volatility of the firm's operating return on assets σ(ROA) x100, where ROA is defined as the ratio of earnings before interest and taxes to total assets; in regression (3) the dependent variable is an indicator denoting whether the firm survived over a 5-year period. Regressions (1) and (2) are run for the panel of observations. Regression (3) can only be run cross-sectionally. Female CEO is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the CEO is a woman, and 0 otherwise. Control variables are defined in Table 1 . P-values, adjusted for heteroskedasticity and clustering at the firm level (in the panel regressions), are reported in brackets below the coefficients.
(1) (2) Table 4 . Propensity score matching estimators
In this table, we identify a control sample of firms that are run by male CEOs by employing a propensity score matching procedure. The propensity score is estimated using all firm characteristics included in our regression analyses. We require that the difference between the propensity score of the firm run by a Female CEO and its matching peer does not exceed 0.1% in absolute value. We then compare the levels of Leverage, σ(ROA) x100 and the likelihood of survival between the two groups. Leverage is defined as the ratio of financial debt divided by the sum of financial debt plus equity. Financial debt is the sum of long term debt (excluding "other non-current liabilities") plus short term loans; the volatility of the firm's operating return on assets is σ(ROA) x100, where ROA is defined as the ratio of earnings before interest and taxes to total assets; the Likelihood of survival is an indicator denoting whether the firm survived over a 5-year period. Table 6 . Treatment effects
In the second stage regressions, in regression (1) the dependent variable is Leverage, defined as the ratio of financial debt divided by the sum of financial debt plus equity; in regression (2) the dependent variable is the volatility of the firm's operating return on assets σ(ROA) x100, where ROA is defined as the ratio of earnings before interests and taxes to total assets; in regression (3) the dependent variable is an indicator denoting whether the firm survived over a 5-year period. In the first stage regressions, we use the local supply of educated women (in each geographic subdivision and in each year) and the attitude towards women (in each geographic subdivision) as exogenous explanatory factors. The local supply of educated women is defined as the ratio of female students to the total number of students in the first and second stage of tertiary education. The attitude towards women is defined as the average proportion of respondents with a higher propensity towards women work to the total number of respondents in a particular region and wave. Control variables are defined in 
